There has recently been renewed focus on the role that collective action clauses (CACs) could play in facilitating the resolution of sovereign debt problems. The most important such clause is the majority restructuring clause, by which a qualified majority of bondholders can vote to alter the payment terms of the bond and make these changes binding even for dissenting bondholders. In this note, we investigate the actual contractual terms of a large sample of bonds issued into the Euromarket by emerging market sovereigns. We identify around $12 billion of issuance over 1997-2002 with New York governing law but which departed from US market convention and included CACs (which are common in bonds with English governing law). In each case the legal adviser was the London office of a US law firm, helping produce this unusual combination of English and American legal practice. It appears that this departure from convention was in some sense inadvertent.
Introduction
There has recently been renewed focus on the role that collective action clauses (CACs) could play in facilitating the resolution of sovereign debt problems. 1 The most prominent such clause is the majority amendment clause, which allows a qualified majority of bondholders to change the payment terms of the bond, in particular, either reducing the amounts payable or prolonging the repayment period. Given the co-ordination problems that may arise when borrowers encounter debt service difficulties, CACs are viewed as being the most reliable way of facilitating modifications to the terms of the bond that would be in the collective interests of bondholders.
This note provides new evidence on the usage of CACs in sovereign bonds issued by emerging market sovereigns. In particular, we document and expand the finding in Richards and Gugiatti (2003) of the existence of a substantial amount of issuance by emerging market sovereigns under New York governing law but which nonetheless departed from the market convention and included CACs. 2 We further investigate the circumstances of these bond issues and document some common factors involving the law firms advising the underwriters on these deals. In each case the legal adviser was the London office of a US law firm, helping produce this convergence of English and American legal practice. Based on correspondence with the law firms involved, it appears that this departure from convention was in some sense inadvertent.
The fact that this group of bonds containing CACs were successfully issued into international markets under New York law has two main implications. Firstly, it provides an additional layer of evidence to support recent findings that market participants have not hitherto focussed on the use or non-use of CACs. Not only have investors, researchers and the official sector been less than fully aware of the true extent of usage of CACs in new bond issuance, but even the legal advisers responsible for drafting the contract terms have had some degree of indifference to the use or non-use of CACs. Secondly, our evidence broadens the range of sovereign issuers and bonds with CACs, and suggests that the 'market practice' argument against broader usage of CACs was in reality less convincing than was previously 1 See IMF (2002a) for a more complete exposition of different types of CACs. 2 The market convention obviously refers to the period before the landmark February 2003 global issue by Mexico, which has been followed by a number of other issues into the US market that include CACs.
assumed. As we illustrate below, the use of CACs has been more widespread than generally thought, with most major issuing countries having already included CACs, and most bond investors that invest in emerging markets probably already holding bonds with CACs, even if they were unaware of it.
Sources of Information about the Contractual Form of Bonds
We begin by presenting some information about the different types of contractual form and the sources for such information. A first point to note is that at the time that a bond is announced to the market, the contractual terms of a bond are often not yet known to investors. The situation as of mid-2003 is described in the following information from the International Primary Market Association (IPMA):
3 'There is no mechanism at present for an investor (or for a co-manager, for that manner) to know at the time she is invited into an issue whether the issue has CACs. … In the Eurobond market, the invitation to co-managers is usually made via an intranet system which IPMA sponsors-the IPMA Screen Invitation System, sometimes referred to loosely as 'Bookrunner'. … Currently neither the IPMA checklist, which is published in our Handbook, nor the template for the screen invitations includes any guidance on CACs. … Most issues are also announced to the world on Reuters (page III-A). The announcement on Reuters is very brief, seldom more than a page, and would never include anything as technical and detailed as CACs. … Investors usually hear about a deal in a telephone call from a salesman at one of the managers. The salesman may be speaking from a term sheet, which was prepared by the syndicate desk or the marketing department of the bank. The term sheet would be highly unlikely to include legal details. … There is a more fundamental problem with informing investors at the time they are offered the bonds. In many cases, the finer points of the terms and conditions of the bonds will not have been agreed between the lead manager and the issuer. In many cases that will include whether or not there will be CACs and, if so, the exact content of them.'
That is, at the time that an issue is announced and priced, it is quite common for investors to be unaware of the precise contractual terms of a bond (including the presence or absence of CACs) and it is even possible that the contractual terms will not even have been agreed upon between the lawyers-though no doubt it is understood that they will be fairly standard.
Of course, the evidence that investors typically do not know-and sometimes could not know-about the contractual terms of the bonds they are buying is very strong evidence against the proposition that there are pricing differences based on the particular contractual form of the bond. If there were such differences in the yields on different types of bonds, the system would have evolved such that the contractual terms were always determined prior to marketing the bond, and the marketing of the bond would clearly spell out the relevant terms.
Once the contractual terms of the bonds have been finalised, in principle it ought to be possible to get information about the nature of the contractual terms. However, in practice there is no single database that reveals if a bond contains CACs. To find out for certain if a bond contains these clauses, an investor or researcher would have to look at the offering circular and examine the conditions under which the terms of the bond can be modified. These documents are often not easy to obtain. In some cases an investor or researcher may also have to refer to the fiscal agency agreement, which contains the specific contractual terms of the bond. In other instances, the offering circular may be a short document that merely summarises and updates the key terms of a pre-existing borrowing program. In either of these two cases, the investor or researcher would have to locate an additional document before he or she could be sure that the bond contained CACs.
Given the difficulty in finding out if bonds contain CACs, 4 researchers have typically relied on looking at the governing law that applies to the bond contract as a proxy. However, it is also not a straightforward exercise to find the governing law of a bond, and typically one must subscribe to a service such as Dealogic's Bondware database to get this information.
The conventional wisdom has been that bonds issued with New York governing law do not contain CACs, while bonds issued with English governing law do contain CACs. These two governing laws account for the bulk of sovereign issuance into international markets (Table 1) .
6 Among other commonly used governing laws, bonds issued with Japanese or Luxembourg governing law typically contain CACs, while bonds issued under German governing law typically do not. Given the prominent role of bonds issued into the US market and/or with New York governing law, it follows that efforts to increase the use of CACs have focused on changing market practice in these cases. Notes. Data based on research by the authors, based on information in Bondware. Euromarket bonds issued under Luxembourg law (around $2.5 billion), which typically contain CACs, are included under English Law for the purpose of this exercise. Where the underlying governing law was not readily available from Bondware, the bond was excluded from the analysis.
Numerous papers from the official sector (e.g., IMF (2002b)) have relied on this correspondence between governing law and the presence or absence of CACs. Similarly, many market participants and researchers have relied on this correspondence, including Petas and Rahman (1999) , Tsatsaronis (1999) , Eichengreen and Mody (2000) , Dixon and Wall (2000) , and Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2003) .
However, as Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2003) have noted, governing law is reasonably closely related to the market of issuance. For example, bonds issued into the Samurai market invariably use Japanese governing law, bonds issued into the Yankee market invariably use New York law, and bonds issued into the global market have almost always also used New York law. It is only in the Euromarket where this close correlation breaks down, with English, New York and German law commonly used, and a small amount of issuance in other governing laws.
Do New York Law Bonds Sometimes Contain CACs?
Given that Euromarket bonds frequently use English governing law and contain CACs, we wondered if there might be cases of bonds issued into the Euromarket under New York governing law that departed from the US market convention and included CACs. The motivation for this exercise was in part driven by the knowledge of a 1998 non-sovereign Thai Euromarket issue that contained CACs although it had US governing law.
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Accordingly, we investigated the contractual terms of a large sample of Eurobonds issued with New York governing law, which according to the conventional wisdom are not supposed to contain CACs, to test whether the convention held true. Bondware includes around 110 such issues between January 1991 and January 2003, and we were able to examine the relevant contractual terms for over half of these bonds in the offering circulars that we could download from the Bondware database. 9 We focused initially on the largest New York law Euromarket issues, and then on those smaller issues that our ongoing search suggested might be candidates for including CACs.
We identified five emerging market sovereign issuers that have issued bonds into the international market under New York governing law but which nonetheless include CACs. The five sovereigns are Bulgaria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Lebanon and Qatar. Although we have not been able to verify the contractual terms of all the bond issuance of these countries, we estimate that of the $13.1 billion of Euromarket issuance from these countries with New York governing law, around $11.9 billion actually contains CACs (see Table 2 ). Indeed, based purely on governing law, one might have expected that less than 20 per cent of these countries' total market issuance would contain CACs, but we estimate that over 90 per cent actually contains CACs.
Almost all of this additional $12 billion of issuance with CACs is still outstanding. Indeed, given that we were not able to examine the contractual terms of all Euromarket issuance with New York governing law, we cannot rule out the possibility that there are additional bonds outstanding with CACs. However, we expect that we have captured most, if not all, such issuance. 10 Accordingly, by reclassifying the New York law issuance in Table 2 , we estimate that the proportion of Euromarket issuance containing CACs is around 55 per cent, versus the figure of 49 per cent that would be suggested by Notes. Data based on research by the authors, based on information in Bondware. In the case of the Lebanese bonds, we have not been able to confirm that every single issue included in the list contains CACs, but have relied on the contractual terms that we have not studied (most of which has been under a single medium-term note program) containing similar terms to those bond contracts that we have seen.
The Form of the CACs Included in New York Law Bonds
An assessment of the CACs included in the New York law bonds issued by these five sovereigns reveals some broad similarities in the legal provisions. Broadly speaking, the provisions (and the bond indentures more generally) are in line with those traditionally used in bonds governed by English law. (The Attachment provides further details on the bonds and the clauses used in each issuance).
All of the bonds were issued under fiscal agency agreements between the sovereign and an investment bank (in all cases a US investment bank). Under this structure, the investment bank acts as an agent of the issuer, with no specific duties towards the bondholders. 11 Each of the bonds contain majority restructuring provisions enabling changes to be made to financial and non-financial terms by a qualified majority of bondholders. In those cases where we were able to determine the majority-vote threshold, it was set at 75 per cent of bondholders at a meeting where a quorum of bondholders is fulfilled (with the exception of Egypt, see below). The quorum requirement is uniform in these cases -for changes to financial terms it is set at 75 per cent of outstanding bonds, and for non-financial terms it is a simple majority. Where a meeting is adjourned and later re-convened the quorum requirement is reduced to 25 per cent for changes to financial terms, and two or more bondholders for other changes. The Egyptian issues, in contrast, adopt simpler (though more stringent) restructuring provisions, requiring an 85 per cent majority vote for amending payment terms and a two-thirds vote for non-payment terms, based on outstanding bonds and without the requirement to hold a physical meeting of bondholders.
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Among other collective action terms, there are some differences in the provisions governing the rights of parties to enforce a bond contract (and pursue litigation) when a default event occurs. Each bond provides for an individual bondholder to accelerate a bond (declare its bonds due and payable) on occurrence of a default event. The Lebanon and Qatar bonds allow for individual acceleration arising from a range of default events, while the others generally restrict it to cases where the sovereign fails to meet a repayment. The provisions governing collective acceleration appear to be uniform; bondholders representing 25 per cent of outstanding bonds can vote to accelerate the entire issue arising from a (broadly defined) default event. The Lebanon bonds, however, do not appear to contain a collective acceleration provision.
The scope to rescind an acceleration motion by a collective vote of bondholders (when the default event is remedied) is increasingly a common feature of bonds issued under both English and New York law. This type of clause can be an important counterweight to a minority of bondholders wishing to accelerate an issue in order to pursue disruptive legal action. The Egypt, Lebanon and Qatar issues do not provide for bondholders to rescind an acceleration motion, while the Bulgaria and Kazakhstan notes allow for it where a simple majority of bondholders vote in favour.
Understanding Why Some New York Law Bonds Included CACs
The question arises as to whether there might be some common factor that led to the use of CACs in these New York law bonds. The most important similarity appears to be the legal advisors to the investment banks that managed the bond issues. Three legal firms were involved in these issues, each being the London office of a New York firm. The London office of Davis, Polk and Wardwell advised the lead managers on the Bulgaria and Kazakhstan issues; the London office of Dewey Ballantine were principal legal advisers on the Lebanon and Egypt bonds; while the London office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom advised on the Qatar issues. Notes. Calculations by the authors, based on information from Bondware. Issuance under governing laws other than English or New York is included in the data for Total Issuance, but is excluded in the other columns. In the case of the bond issues by Dewey Ballantine, the table includes only those Lebanese issues for which Bondware listed the legal advisor, and excludes other issuance under Lebanon's EMTN program that was probably also advised by Dewey Ballantine.
To further investigate the relationship between the law firms involved in Eurobond issues and the governing law of the bonds, we examined the Bondware database for the legal advisors to the lead managers of bond issues. This information is unfortunately only available for a subset (around 40 per cent) of all issues, but we have no reason to think that the bonds for which we have this information are unrepresentative of the full set of bonds.The data on legal advisors in Table 3 suggest a number of general points. First, it can be seen that UK-headquartered firms account for a very large share of Euromarket issuance, with just two UK firms accounting for about two thirds of all issues. The dominance of UK firms is hardly surprising given the location of the market. 13 Second, the table suggests a strong association between the governing law of the bond and whether the legal advisor is UK-or US-headquartered. The bond contracts produced by UK-headquartered firms almost invariably use English governing law, whereas the bond contracts produced by US-headquartered firms usually specify New York governing law.
Third, the table shows that the advisors on the New York law bonds that included CACs are all US-headquartered firms, and not among the most active advisors. 14 Hence, it might not be surprising if these law firms did not have pre-existing "boilerplate" contracts for sovereign issues into the Euromarket. (We return to this point below.)
The existence of these bonds raises the question of whether the lawyers involved were cognisant of the innovative nature of the legal terms being used, and whether there were particular factors that influenced the choice of these provisions. Interestingly, based on some communications with the law firms involved in issuing these bonds with CACs, our assessment is that the inclusion of CACs was not necessarily a deliberate decision and was perhaps even somewhat inadvertent, although at least one firm made a conscious decision to include collective action provisions in the New York law bond that are normally found in English law bonds, because they felt it would be potentially beneficial to the issuer and majority holders.
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Liaison with some of the legal advisers to the lead managers revealed that the terms and conditions were, in a number of cases, essentially taken from pre-existing bonds. This generally involved the law firms drawing upon or copying the contractual terms from earlier issues either by that country or another country in the same region, and changing the governing law from English to New York law.
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The communications with the law firms did not provide much guidance as to exactly why the firms had used an English-style contractual form but had modified it to make New York law the governing law for the contracts. One possibility would be that either the lead manager or the law firm believed that the bonds would be marketed to some US investors and that these investors would prefer to see New York law as the governing law.
17 However, if it had been thought that US investors would actually look closely at the terms of the contract, then we would expect that the entire contractual form would have been changed towards New York style clauses. Instead, the more likely reason for changing the governing law to New York is presumably that these were New York law firms and they preferred to shift the governing law for the contracts to their "home markets". The fact that they did not also change the full contractual form may reflect the fact that the law firms involved are all reasonably minor players in advising on Euromarket issuance, so they may not have had their own preferred "boiler-plate" contractual language for Euromarket bond issues.
The correspondence with the law firms included one case where a partner revealed a degree of surprise upon learning about his firm's use of a non-standard mix of English contractual terms and New York governing law. In another case, at least some partners in the law firm apparently had not been aware that they had done a bond issue for the country in question that included CACs. These two responses would suggest that the law firms involved in most of these issues-and most likely the other parties to the deal-had not focused on this particular aspect of the bond indenture to any great degree. However, in the Egyptian issues, the decision to set the required majority for changes to the financial terms at 85 per cent of outstanding principal (versus the usual requirement of 75 per cent of those represented at a meeting) suggests a conscious decision on the part of some party to the deal. However, the fact that there were no reports about this aspect in Bondware, Bloomberg or anywhere else suggests that it passed unnoticed by investors.
Overall, the results of our investigation into the use of CACs in these New York law bonds points to a certain randomness in the particular terms and conditions that are included in emerging market bond issues into the Euromarket, including the use or non-use of CACs and even the governing law of bonds. This is consistent with the evidence cited in Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2003) that the market-place has historically paid little or no attention to this particular aspect of bond contracts. It is also consistent with observations by market participants (e.g., Petas and Rahman (1999) ; Dammers (2002) ; and the above information from IPMA) that the inclusion of CACs has simply not been an important decision variable for borrowers or investors.
Indeed, the issuance decisions of sovereigns show a certain randomness in the use or non-use of CACs. For example, Richards and Gugiatti (2003) show that-prior to the 2003 Mexican issue-18 of the 20 largest emerging market issuers had issued bonds with CACs, and 17 of these had issued bonds both with and without CACs. In addition, an examination of issuance by the systemically important countries that make up the G-20 countries also illustrates that all of those countries that have been active issuers in international market have issued bonds with CACs (Table 4) .
Conclusion
Following Mexico's path-breaking February 2003 issue, there have been numerous issues of bonds with CACs into the US market. This has demonstrated that the supposed strong aversion of US investors towards these provisions has eased. Indeed, the fact that newswire reports of only a very few of the issues referred to their use of CACs indicates that the use of CACs has rapidly become a non-issue. This is hardly surprising given the evidence cited above that most major issuing countries-mature and emerging-had already issued bonds with CACs, and the evidence in Richards (2003) that many US investors already held bonds with CACs, even if they were unaware of it. This note has provided new evidence that the use of CACs has been even wider than was previously thought, and that even some New York law bonds have included CACs. Furthermore, it appears that some of the law firms responsible for these bond contracts may not have made conscious decisions about the particular legal terms used, which is an additional layer of evidence that the use or non-use of CACs has not previously been focussed on by participants in sovereign debt markets. Our findings also lend support to the evidence that the presence or absence of CACs has not affected bond pricing: 18 if investors have not been aware of which bonds contain CACs, it is difficult to see how CACs could have been priced. 
